The death penalty is legal in 36 states, and physicians are expected to attend and participate in executions. Yet, every major medical and health-related organization opposes physician participation in capital punishment. This article argues that it is unethical for physicians within the role as medical professional to participate in capital punishment, and that such acts erode the foundation of trust at the heart of medical practice. We believe that it is important for professional groups and medical societies to impose sanctions on members who choose to participate in executions.
This discordance between professional standards and actual practice is quite remarkable in that, although physicians continue to participate in executions, none, to our knowledge, have been censured or reprimanded by a professional organization. Unlike physician assistance in suicide, recently the subject of a passionate national debate, physician participation in execution has received almost no attention from the media and arouses little controversy among the general public.
Even though many Americans and many physicians in their role as citizens view capital punishment as morally acceptable, it is within the role as medical professional that the ethicality of physician involvement in capital punishment should be assessed. The active involvement of physicians in harming persons as agents of the state must be evaluated in light of the beneficence obligations physicians maintain toward those they treat and in light of a basic tenet of the profession: first, do no harm. The redefinition of the relationship between doctors and their patients represented by physician involvement in capital punishment is inconsistent with the integrity of medicine as a profession.
Involvement of physicians in capital punishment is occurring at a time of substantial erosion in individual patient and societal trust in physicians and the medical establishment. ~1 In fact, the call for doctors to become executioners may be viewed as analogous to other current demands made of physicians, such as gag orders that forbid discussion of treatment options or criticism of institutional policies, which create conflicts related to dual agency. 12 Each of these demands requires physicians to abandon historical duties and obligations to patients and become technicians rather than professionals whose primary concern is patient welfare. Thus, although few physicians are asked to participate in executions, discussion of physician involvement in capital punishment has contemporary relevance to many ethical concerns.
To consider an ethical analysis of physician involvement in capital punishment, we first must define what constitutes involvement in this process. Involvement in capital punishment includes the design of protocols and procedures to be used; prescription of lethal medications; and direct participation by supervising, assistirtg, or witnessing execution in a medical capacity and monitoring vital signs to pronounce death. ~~ Not all interactions between physicians and prisoners who will be executed constitute participation in capital punishment. There needs to be a clear and sharp ethical distinction between providing prisoners with medical care and participating in executions. Even after sentencing, prisoners remain persons with medical needs related or unrelated to their status as prison-ers. Physicians may, and should, provide needed medical evaluation and treatment to the condemned so long as such care is guided by concern for the patient's welfare and respect for the rights of competent persons to consent to or refuse treatment.
A consistent rationale for precluding physician involvement in capital punishment can be found within the concept of professional integrity. 13 Professional integrity constitutes the value system of the professional group and defines the boundaries of acceptable practice. The concept of professional integrity provides a rationale for consistent ethical behavior over time and in the face of diverse situations. This concept describes group adherence to a body of ethical values and principles by which individuals navigate through a complex moral landscape in which choices rarely are unambiguously right or wrong, and not all possible consequences can be foreseen. However, professional integrity, unlike personal integrity, is determined not only by individual conscience, but also by the duties and obligations that accompany membership in a specific profession. These duties and obligations create distinctive norms that unite the membership of a given profession and describe professional expectations common to all members.
To assist in understanding professional integrity with respect to medicine, it is helpful to look to the proper goals of medicine. An international group, under the auspices of the Hastings Center, has recently done a careful review that resulted in a modem interpretation of the time-honored explicit and implicit goals of medicine. 14 They concluded that, through the use of knowledge, care, and compassion, the three overarching goals of medicine are (1) to save and extend life; (2) to promote, maintain, and restore health; and (3) to ameliorate and relieve suffering. While these goals may come into conflict, the primary duty of the physician is to benefit the patient and avoid actions that decrease the wellbeing of the patient. In addition to being guided by the welfare of the patient, medical interventions ought to fulfill the following criteria: voluntary and uncoerced consent, reasonable utility, and benefits proportional to the risks and harms. Such violations of professional integrity must be distinguished from matters of personal conscience, for which individual physicians might find certain actions personally morally objectionable. An example of such a distinction between breaches of professional and personal integrity might be found in the controversial area of abortion. Although many physicians find participation in abortion procedures to be unacceptable personally, the medical profession, through its organizations, has taken a view consistent with that of the society: abortion under certain circumstances is both legal and ethical, and it remains a matter of individual conscience for the patient and the physician to decide on participation.
The physician who chooses to participate in performing abortions justifies that action as consistent with beneficence-based obligations to the woman who requests the procedure. In contrast, with capital punishment, although society has agreed that under certain circumstances it is legal, the medical profession has deemed participation by physicians in this activity is not a matter of conscience, but is unethical because execution is the direct infliction of harm with no redeeming medical benefit to the patient.
Some might argue that capital punishment could be reconciled with the goals of medicine and a physician's professional integrity. There are essentially three justifications argued for physician involvement in capital punishment: participation as a nonmedical act, involvement as an obligation to society, and involvement to avoid preventable suffering to the "patient" condemned to die.
The first justification proposes that physicians, when employing the specialized knowledge and tools of their profession toward capital punishment, are not practicing medicine per se, but rather are acting directly as agents of the state.
This argument suggests that capital punishment is not a clinical transaction; therefore, physicians ought not be bound by medical ethics when acting in pursuit of such "nonclinical" ends. ~6 It certainly is true that physicians may play roles in our society distinct from their professional role as doctor. However, it appears duplicitous to argue that physicians simply can step in and out of their professional roles and obligations at will while continuing to use the special knowledge and skills uniquely attributed to physicians. This argument trivializes the concept of professional integrity in which consistency and moral accountability are valued and has the potential to undermine trust in the profession. As long as physicians use the knowledge and techniques attributed to medicine, they ought to be bound by the ethical standards of the profession. In contrast, in the context of capital punishment, it is much harder to quantify the proportional benefit accruing to others as a result of executing the prisoner.
There is currently no evidence that capital punishment per se deters other potential killers. 17 In addition, society may prevent a criminal from hurting others by imposing lifetime incarceration in a secure prison facility rather than execution.
Even if capital punishment were determined in the future to have a deterrent effect, involvement of a physician in such drastic and irrevocable harm cannot be justified merely because it may influence the behavior of hypothetical others at risk of becoming killers. In each of the examples in which a physician legitimately acts to discharge public health obligations while compromising duties to the patient, there are specific, identifiable persons who will be harmed if this breach in the doctor-patient relationship does not occur.
The third, and most compelling, argument for physician involvement in capital punishment seeks neither to sidestep nor to trivialize the doctor-patient relationship, but finds justification in duties owed patients by their physicians. According to this rationale, physicians must become involved in the killing of prisoners to allow them a dignified and humane death. This is thought to fall within an essential component of the physician's ethical obligations, the duty to relieve suffering of a person in an inevitable dying process. From this perspective, the condemned prisoner is equivalent to a patient in the dying process, and participation in the provision of a humane and painless death is justified because the potential for increased pain and suffering is avoided. Many prisoners subject to capital punishment might prefer the involvement of a physician to ensure the An argument is made analogous to the involvement of physicians in torture.
Here, the goal of physician participation may be to regulate the administration of punishment to ensure that it is halted before the point of killing or irreversibly maiming the victim, while at the same time ensuring the desired societal end of obtaining information. An additional example of contemporary concern is that of a physician confronted by a family about to return to a country and culture in which clitoridectomy is performed routinely on young girls. The participation by the physician in this "female circumcision" might ensure that the procedure is done aseptically and with minimum harm and suffering, assuming that it is inevitable that such mutilation will occur. In both of these cases, although physician participation might be rationalized on humanitarian grounds, the physician's professional integrity ought to preclude participation. The infliction of direct harm or mutilation of healthy persons without medical benefit, regardless of intent and societal goals, is not a part of the ethical practice of medicine and 
